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Abstract
We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge
for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovators
intellectual property rights (IPR). Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer
of the interim innovation, arise from his ability to prevent the upstream research unit from
forming nancial coalitions at the ex interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and
structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, either based on trade secrets or via
patenting. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the nancial structure of licensing
fees and show that the innovators nancial constraint is more likely to bind when the value
of her innovation is low. By constraining the exibility of the upstream unit regarding her
choice of the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is
able to reduce the research units payo¤s in such contingencies. This incentivises the research
unit to expend costly e¤ort ex ante to generate more productive interim innovations. We
show that such interim control rights can be renegotiation-proof.
JEL Codes: D23, K12, O32.
1 Introduction
What is an appropriate, and empirically relevant, notion of control rights of one agent over
another, who generates and trades her intellectual property in the form of an interim idea
or innovation to be further developed by the controlling agent? Can this notion be consistent
with the empirically realistic assumption that innovator has inalienable intellectual property
rights (IPR), in a sense similar to that for the human capital of the entrepreneur in a nancial
contract, as in Hart and Moore (1994). Specically, when would such a notion of ex ante
agreed control rights impact on the bargaining process between these two agents ex interim,
over the licensing of any intellectual property generated by the innovator to the controlling
partner? Can the possibility of such an impact be consistent with the inalienability of the
innovators IPR, in so far as she is entitled, in the event of disagreement over the terms of
licensing with her controlling partner, to approach other partners for licensing her interim
innovative ideas? Finally, what implications do such a role for control rights over intellectual
property have for our understanding of the roles played by commonly observed institutional
arrangements, such as corporate venture.1
In this paper, we introduce a novel notion of Control Rights, given ex ante incomplete
contracts, in a context of the licensing of intellectual property of observable but non-veriable
quality. We consider a setting of cumulative research and development (R&D). An interim
innovation, invented by an upstream research unit (RU) is licensed to one of two competing
downstream development units (DUs), who are the only parties capable given deep pockets
or other internal resources of developing this innovation. We assume the inalienability of
items of intellectual property from their originators. We then interpret our notion of control
rights as those arising from bilateral contractual relationships between a research unit and
a development unit, both of which are needed to bring innovative ideas to the market, in
the form of Corporate Venturing. In particular, we emphasise the impact of our notion of
control rights in corporate venturing on the equilibrium choice of the mode of licensing of
the innovation, via patenting or via relying on trade secrets, which in turn a¤ects the ex
ante incentives of RU to invest in more rather than less promising innovation.
1Corporate venturing is the institutional arrangement imitating venture capital market within large corpo-
rations. See Gompers and Lerner (2000) for a detailed discussion and empirical analysis of this phenomenon.
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Some earlier literature on property rights in such cumulative R&D endeavours (e.g.
Aghion and Tirole, 1994) has assumed that control rights over an upstream RU of a down-
stream DU gives the latter unconditional rights to make protable use of any innovations by
the former. Such a strong notion of control is at odds with empirical evidence even in the
context of (ex-)employees of rms engaged in both research and development.2We assume
instead that allocation of control rights to a DU a¤ects the a¢ liated RUs bargaining po-
sition, via constraining her away from nding nancial coalition partners who may aid her
(otherwise wealth-constrained) bargaining with the controlling DU. However, our RU always
retains the right to patent her intellectual property and to license it to one or the other of
the two competing DUs.
The licensing of interim innovations from RUs to DUs in our model is subject to a
problem of ensuring that such knowledge transfers are in e¤ect exclusive, so that a licensed
item of interim innovative knowledge would not then be also sold clandestinely to competing
DUs. In our model, this is attempted to be ensured by one of two mechanisms, or modes of
licensing of intellectual property.
One such mechanism involves the patenting of interim innovative knowledge prior to its
dissemination, by means of sequentially inviting competing bids for its licensing for further
development. Patenting ensures exclusive licensing: if the RU makes a clandestine sale to
a DUj after exclusively licensing patented knowledge to a DUi, DUjs nal invention would
not be patentable and thus easily imitated since it would embody codiable aspects of
the interim licensed innovation. If the patented mode is chosen, then in our model a DU
having control rights over its ventured upstream RU obtains no advantage whatsoever in
the form or the extent of fees it would have to pay for an exclusive license.3 The cost of
patenting, for the RU as well as her licensee DU, is a partial leakage of knowledge arising
from those aspects of it which are non-codiable in the description for a patent that would
accrue to the non-licensee DU in the process of describing the interim innovation in public.
Alternatively, the RU could attempt to license her idea exclusively to a DU by relying on
trade secrets. However, if she then clandestinely sells the same idea to some other DU(s),
who may subsequently invent a marketable product, trade secret law would not preclude
3In our companion paper, Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), we show that exclusive (rather than multiple)
licensing of knowledge always maximizes the licensors revenue.
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such a DU obtaining a patent on her invention, on the pretext that he had rediscovered the
idea himself. Hence, to ensure exclusive licensing by the RU to a DU, the latter would have
to give the RU a share of potential post-invention revenues arising from developing the idea.
The share should be su¢ ciently high to ensure that the knowledge would not be resold. In
turn, that would diminish the incentives of such a DU to develop the idea resulting in a
lower probability of successful development.
In our companion paper, Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), we develop a theory of optimal
choices over these two modes of licensing, and their dependence on the levels of knowledge
associated with innovative ideas, as well as the proportional leakage of knowledge arising
from descriptions thereof. In that paper we assume independence of RUs from DUs vis-
a-vis choices over modes of licensing, and no nancial constraints for the RU. However, it
turns out that a nancial constraint may indeed bind for an RU that is wealth-constrained
when she prefers trade-secret-based licensing. The reason for this is that to ensure (credibly
commit to) exclusive sale of her knowledge, she may need to be given such a high share of
her licensee DUs post-invention revenue that, in the absence of ex interim transfers in the
opposite direction, from the RU to the DU, any DU would prefer that the RU to patent her
idea instead, and then solicit competing responses to o¤ers for an exclusive licensing of the
interim innovation.
If an RU is independent, and she has access to a nancial coalition partner in the form
of an outside Venture Capitalist who may advance her resources upon the realisation of her
interim innovation, RU could then make the requisite transfer to her licensee DU. She should
be able to persuade her DU to accede to her preferred mode of licensing, provided that her
venture capitalist (VC) partner has adequate expertise to ensure that the RU acts in the
interest of their coalition in deciding on further clandestine sales to other DUs. This would
occur when the total ex interim net expected surplus, given costly development prospects,
is higher when a given item of knowledge is licensed without being patented.
However, as we show via an example below, it may be in the ex ante interest of a DU 
who has acquired control rights ex ante regarding such ex interim coalition formation by his
controlled RU to proscribe such nancial coalitions, even at the expense of sacricing ex
interim optimal choice of the mode of licensing. This lack of ex interim nancial exibility
is a commitment device that might provide RU with stronger incentives ex ante to aim for
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more promising interim innovation involving higher e¤ort (in a manner analogous to that in
Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
The reason for this is that, as we show in our companion paper, the extent of revenue
share that must be given to RU to ensure her exclusive licensing to a DU in the trade-secret-
based mode, goes up when the RUs realised interim knowledge level is lower. Hence, the
scenario above is more likely to arise for low knowledge levels and high levels of leakage of
knowledge in the process of describing it, for a patent or for a clandestine sale to a competing
DU. As a result, if a controlling DU can ensure that his RU would have to patent and thereby
obtain a low licensing fee when she generates low levels of knowledge ex interim, he would
incentivise RU to strive for higher knowledge levels, by expending further costly e¤ort ex
ante.
In fact, such a control right of a DU may itself be renegotiation-proof at the ex interim
stage, despite the fact that the DU allowing a RU-VC coalition to form at that point may
enhance the overall surplus summed across RU and himself. That is the case when the
controlling DUs ex interim expected payo¤with patent-based licensing is no lower than the
(for example symmetric, as in Rubinstein, 1982) share of this surplus he would obtain if
he were to relax his control right, allowing a RU-VC coalition to go for trade secret-based
licensing of the idea. The key contract law observation relevant here is that a potential
RU-VC coalition could not make a legally binding promise to make a strictly higher payo¤
to a DU, than what he would obtain with a patent-based license from the RU, the only pre-
existing contractual partner of the DU. In this respect, our example improves on those in
Hart and Moore (2004), which also envisages control as ruling out ex-interim renegotiations
over a subset of items in an ex ante contractm in a multi-dimensional setting.
Our theory of what corporate venturing may accomplish thus entirely abstracts from
any advantages that a DU partner may have over an ordinary nancial partner, such as
an independent venture capitalist (VC), in providing advice, or expertise, or monitoring
services to an RU, as well as any disadvantages a DU may su¤er from vis-a-vis usurping
ex post surpluses attributable to inventions based on knowledge licensed from a partner
RU. We also assume away all technological synergies specic to this particular DU. It is
thereby complementary to the papers of Anand and Galetovic (2000), and Hellmann (2002).
Our model shares some insights with Hellman (1998) where RU gives up control rights to a
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venture capitalist to protect the latter from RUs opportunistic behavior; like in our paper,
in Hellman (1998) RUs nancial constraints prevent the venture capitalist from providing
incentives to RU via an equity stake. Yet, our model studies a richer setting where we
distinguish between independent and strategicventure capitalist, where RUs stake has an
impact on next-stage development, and where the outcome depends on the mode of licensing
which in turn is chosen endogenously, given the ex ante contractual relationships.
The main empirical predictions of our theory are straightforward. Other things equal,
namely holding constant the quality of the interim innovation we should expect to see a
higher likelihood of patenting by RUs in corporate venturing relationships. Any additional
e¢ ciency of the research (cum development) processes in such corporate venturing entities
may have nothing to do with a direct e¢ ciency-enhancing impact of DUsventuring on the
e¤ectiveness of RUsresearch, but with bargaining distortionsit brings about. Moreover,
our theory would predict that the formation of such corporate venture-based (funding of) RU
ties is more likely to arise in elds in which the extent of knowledge leakage from patenting
is high, not because an independent RU would not choose trade secret-based licensing ex
interim then, but because denying her exibility in doing so is more likely to be in the
ex ante interests of controlling DUs, for lower levels of interim knowledge. These empirical
implications are yet to be tested, although they are consistent with existing evidence; Kortum
and Lerner (2000) show that researchers backed by venture capitalists are more likely to
license more valuable innovations both via patents and using trade secrets. Further research
on the di¤erences between venture nancing by the downstream development unites versus
independent nanciaers is awaited.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model; we describe the equilibrium
choice of licensing mode and structure of licensing fees assuming away nancial constraints.
Section 3 discusses the role of the ex ante control rights in the context of an example where
reallocation of control rights to the DU provides RU with stronger incentives to exert research
e¤ort. In Section 4, we consider a modication of our setup to address the relationship of
our results to those in some related literature on the impact of soft versus tough (debtor- vs.
creditor-friendly) bankruptcy laws on innovative rms. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 The setup
The model is similar to the one in our companion paper Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006).
There are three risk-neutral agents: a research unit RU and two competing development units
DU1 and DU2. Both DUs have deep pockets, while RU is nancially constrained. These
parties undertake research (by RU) and development (by DUs) to create a new product.
The investments in research and development are sequential. First, RU produces knowledge
K 2 [0; 1]: This knowledge is an input in the development stage which may result in the
creation of a new product. If only one DU develops successfully, he obtains a monopoly rent
of V = 1 in the product market. If two DUs succeed in development, they compete a la
Bertrand and both get zero rents.
We assume K to be the outcome of random process with a distribution G(K; e) that
depends on RUs costly e¤ort choice, e, ex ante. For each DU, his probability P of suc-
cessful development is a function of his acquired knowledge and subsequent non-contractible
development e¤ort E 2 [0; 1=2] :
P = p(K;E) =
p
2KE: (1)
The e¤orts e and E are measured in terms of their costs. These are assumed non-veriable.
Knowledge is metrized in terms of the maximum probability of successful second-stage
invention it could lead to. The constraint E  1=2 is to make sure that this proba-
bility cannot exceed 1. However, in all equilibria considered in the paper E  K=2 =
argmaxE
hp
2KE   E
i
; so that this constraint is never binding. We describe the processes
of choice over modes of knowledge licensing, and bargaining on the division of surplus, which
serve to endogenise DUse¤ort choices.
2.2 Timing and assumptions
The timing of events is presented in the Figure 1.
Ex ante, the parties choose an allocation of control rights: either (i) RU and DUs are
independent, or (ii) one DU has control over RU. Then RU invests e in knowledge generation.
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Choice of mode of licensing,
bargaining about licensing fee,
potential for opportunistic sale
Each DUi
exerts
effort Ei
RU exerts
research effort e
Realization of
knowledge K
Figure 1: Timing
Ex interim, knowledge K is realized. The parties choose the mode of licensing of RUs
knowledge, and bargain on the licensing fee. The bargaining game in each mode, with and
without patenting, is described below (further details are provided in our companion paper
Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2006). There are two alternative modes of knowledge licensing.
One is the open, or patent-based mode, and the other one is closed, or trade-secret-based
mode. In the open mode, a patent is registered, so that RU can commit to sell her knowledge
to one party only.RU describes her knowledge publicly which leads to a partial leakage of
her knowledge; an exogenous proportion L 2 [0; 1] of her capability K is transferred to both
DUs. Both DUs also infer the level of RUs knowledge K from this description. The rm
i that licenses the full content of RUs knowledge pays RU a lump-sum fee Fo and chooses
development e¤ort Ei; the respective probability of development is Pi = p(K;Ei): The other
rm j chooses e¤ort Ej; and the probability of development is Pj = p(LK;Ej): These e¤ort
choices fEi; Ejg form Nash equilibrium strategies in the post-licensing subgame between the
two DUs.
In the closed mode, knowledge licensing occurs through a private sale to one of the DUs,
who is randomly chosen by an independent RU, or is the DU who has control rights over
RU owing to an ex ante corporate venturing arrangement. The latter may have included
nancing RUs initial veriable research costs, over and above her non-veriable e¤ort choice
ex ante. The parties bargain about their licensing contract, with its payo¤s contingent in
part on DUis post-invention revenues, which serves the role of eliminating RUs incentive
to make a clandestine knowledge sale to the other DUj. As the ex post outcome is binary
(V = 1 or V = 0), this contract includes only two variables: a lump-sum transfer Fc from
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DUi to RU and RUs royalty share s in DUis ex post revenues. To initiate the bargaining,
RU provides a description of her knowledge, which is su¢ cient for DUi to infer its level K.
This description leads to some partial leakage of RUs knowledge, LK, to DUi.4 After RU
and DUi agree on the terms of licensing, RU reveals the full content of her knowledge to
the licensee DUi, and DUi chooses his development e¤ort Ei. We denote Pc as his resulting
choice of the probability of nal invention.
RU could also sell her knowledge to DUj subsequently: In this opportunistic deviation
by RU, she would rst describe her knowledge to DUj; this would cause leakage LK: If they
agree on a fee for RU disclosing the full content of her knowledge, DUj would then choose
the probability of development Pd (where d stands for deviation) given the DUis choice of
Pc. If RU and DUj fail to agree upon the licensing fee, DUj would develop on the basis of
leaked knowledge LK; in this case we denote his choice of probability of invention as ePd.
By choosing RUs revenue share s appropriately, DUi will try to preclude RUs knowledge
disclosure to DUj: If s is su¢ ciently high, RU could be interested in protecting DUis ex
post rents from competition (this e¤ect is discussed in Pisano, 1989); we characterize when
this is feasible.
Post invention, successful developers compete a la Bertrand. If only one DU invents
successfully, he obtains a monopoly rent of V = 1. If both develop successfully then both get
zero V = 0, which is also their payo¤ if neither invents. We assume that courts can verify
ex post revenues (i.e. whether V = 1 or V = 0), but not the level of interim knowledge K;
nor the e¤orts Ei;j, or e, which are privately chosen. We assume equal bargaining power in
ex interim bilateral bargaining between a DU and an RU.
2.3 Interim payo¤s
We will denote as Tc and To the total equilibrium ex interim expected surplus of RU cum the
licensee DU obtaining the full knowledge in the closed and in the open mode, respectively.
We will denote as Uoi (Pi; Pj;K) the expected ex interim payo¤of this DU in the development
race in the open mode, whereas the other DUj chooses probability of invention Pj to maximize
Uoj (Pj; Pi;LK) : According to (1), DUis e¤ort cost is Ei = P 2i =(2K) so that in the open
mode
Uoi = [(1  Pj)Pi   P 2i =(2K)  Fo] (2)
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which increases in K and decreases in Pj: Since Fo is paid before the development e¤ort is
chosen, the DUis payo¤ (2) is maximized at Pi = K(1  Pj): The competing DUj develops
on the basis of leaked knowledge LK; he maximizes his payo¤
Uoj = [(1  Pi)Pj   P 2j =(2LK)]
by choosing Pj = LK(1  Pi):
Correspondingly, in the closed model of knowledge sale the licensee DU obtains:
Uc = [(1  s)Pi   P 2i =(2K)  Fc] (3)
where Pc is the optimal choice of Pi in this mode: The RUs payo¤ consists of the royalty
sPc and the cash payment Fc made before the choice of development e¤ort. For simplicity,
we assume that the non-licensee DUj has no development capabilities in equilibrium. The
licensing terms, Fc and s; are chosen via bilateral bargaining between RU and DUi; the
contract terms incentivise RU not to sell her knowledge to DUj later.
2.4 The mode of licensing and the structure of licensing fees
The bargaining structure above implies that the choice of the mode would be made according
to whether or not the total (subgame- perfect) equilibrium payo¤s summed across the RU
and her licensee DU, To;c is higher in the open or the closed mode of licensing, unless RUs
nancial constrain is binding. Suppose that the level of RUs required revenue share s to
ensure an exclusive closed-mode sale is so high that RU has to make a lump-sum payment to
her licensee DUi : Fc < 0. As RUs wealth constraint precludes her making the payment, the
parties may have to patent the knowledge for licensing, even though Tc > To: This happens
whenever Tc sPc < To Fo. As we show in the next Section, this has important implications
for the organizational structure of R&D, which in turn a¤ects the ex ante incentives of RU to
expend e¤ort for higher levels of knowledge. We now summarise the results in our companion
paper Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), regarding equilibrium payo¤s of the RU and her
licensee DU.
Open mode. If a patent is registered then (the exclusive licensee) DUi pays RU a
licensing fee Fo and obtains knowledge K: At the same time, knowledge LK is leaked to the
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public domain, so the competing DUj can also engage in the development contest. The joint
surplus of RU and DUi will therefore equal To = [Uoi+Fo]; see (2). The competing DUj will
use the leaked knowledge LK, and will therefore receive [(1  Po) ePo   eP 2o =(2LK)]: Here the
probabilities
n
Po; ePoo satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions:
Po = argmax
p
h
(1  ePo)p  p2=(2K)i = K(1  ePo);
ePo = argmax
q

(1  Po)q   q2=(2LK)

= LK(1  Po):
For each pair of K and L the solution is unique:
Po =
K   LK2
1  LK2 ;
ePo = LK   LK2
1  LK2 : (4)
Essentially, the sequential o¤ers (to DUi, then to DUj if rejected by DUi) bargaining
process in this mode results in Bertrand competition between the two DUs: RU extracts
all the additional surplus of the licensed DU, making his participation constraint bind. The
equilibrium payo¤s of the RU and DU, characterised in Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006),
are as follows:
To =
K(1  LK)2
2 (1  LK2)2 ; Fo =
K(1  L)
2 (1  LK2) ; Uo = To   Fo =
K(1 K)2L
2 (1  LK2)2 : (5)
Closed mode. If the contracting parties do not register a patent but choose disclosure
via a closed sale, there is no leakage to outsiders in equilibrium. However, in order to provide
RU with incentives not to disseminate knowledge to the competing DUj, DUi has to give
away a su¢ cient share s of his ex post revenues in royalties to RU, so that:
[sPc   sPc(1  Pd)] 
h
(1  Pc)Pd   P 2d =(2K)
	  n(1  Pc) ePd   eP 2d =(2LK)oi : (6)
where Pc is chosen by the licensee DUi and
n
Pd; ePdo are the potential choices of the other
DUj if the RU attempts to sell knowledge to her. Pd is chosen by DUj if she has full
knowledge, and ePd is her choice with leaked knowledge LK: For a given share s; the left-
hand side in (6) is the reduction in the RUs expected payo¤ due to opportunistic disclosure
to DUj: The right hand side is the maximum licensing fee that RU may extract from DUj
in case she decides to disclose to him after licensing her knowledge to DUi: The logic of
calculating this licensing fee is very similar to the one in patent-based licensing: since the
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process of negotiating the fee results in a partial leakage of knowledge LK, RU can obtain
from DUj at most the expression in the right-hand side. If and only if (6) is violated, there
exists a fee that DUj will be willing to pay and RU will be willing to accept in exchange for
the clandestine second sale.
While giving a su¢ ciently high share of ex post revenues to RU rules out opportunistic
disclosure, it comes at a cost of lowering the licensed DUs incentives to apply e¤ort. Indeed,
by solving for optimal e¤ort of DUj and DUi we nd that Pc decreases in s :
Pd = argmax
p

(1  Pc)p  p2=(2K)

= K(1  Pc); (7)
ePd = argmax
q

(1  Pc)q   q2=(2LK)

= LK(1  Pc); (8)
Pc = argmax
p

(1  s)p  p2=(2K) = K(1  s): (9)
In equilibrium, RU and DUi will choose the minimum possible s 2 [0; 1] that satises
(6). Substituting (7)-(9) into (6) we nd
sK(1  s)  (1 K(1  s)) (1  L)=2: (10)
Solving this inequality we derive
Lemma 1 A mechanism for a closed knowledge sale, which is incentive-compatible for no
further disclosure by the RU, requires RU to be given a (minimum) share s = s(K;L) in
her licensee DUs post-invention revenues, where s(K;L) satises:
s(K;L) =

1 + L 
p
(1 + L)2   8(1  L)(1=K   1)

=4 < 1=2: (11)
The licensee DU develops with probability Pi = Pc = K(1  s(K;L)); the other DU does not
develop. This closed mode licensing is only feasible if such s(K;L) exists, i.e., whenever
K  bK(L), where bK(L) = 1 + (1 + L)2
8(1  L)
 1
: (12)
Proof. See Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006).
Whenever the closed mode is incentive-compatible, the RUs share s(K;L) decreases
with K: Indeed, a higher K raises the probability of successful development; since selling
the innovation to two competing developers would result in a higher ex post rent dissipation
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due to Bertrand competition. Therefore RU has incentives not to disclose to the second DU
even if her share s is small. Furthermore, the value of RUs stake in post-invention revenues
sPc decreases in K: Clearly, whenever s = s(K;L) exists, it decreases in K; and so that
right-hand side of (10) decreases in K: Therefore the left-hand side sK(1   s) = sPc also
decreases in K: The joint surplus of RU and DUi
Tc = Pc   P 2c =(2K) = K
 
1  s(K;L)2 =2 (13)
is increasing in K: This joint surplus is concave in K and approaches K=2 as K increases;
although s(K;L) decreases in K; its rate of decrease slows down at higher levels of K:
Indeed, s(K;L) is convex in K as s(K;L) is a negative linear function of a square root of
concave function of K:
3 Control rights and ex ante incentives
The solution above neglects the RUs ex interim nancial constraint. RUs nancial con-
straint Fc  0 may become binding ex interim, when her minimum incentive compatible eq-
uity stake sPc is su¢ ciently high. Straightforward calculations yield Fc = (1 3s)(1 s)K=4:
Therefore, the RUs nancial constraint, Fc  0; is binding whenever s(K;L) > 1=3: This
results in potential ex interim ine¢ ciency: there may arise a situation where the joint surplus
is higher in the closed mode Tc > To but the licensee DUi prefers the open mode. This dis-
agreement occurs whenever (To   Fo) > (Tc   sPc) : If RU had deep pockets, she would pay
DUi at the interim stage for forgoing the open mode option, but since RU is cash constrained
the ex interim e¢ cient mode can only be implemented if she has some external source of
nancing. First, we consider a situation where the parties ex ante agree on the RU remaining
independent. In this case the RU may overcome this ex interim ine¢ ciency using outside
venture capital. The second scenario is corporate venturing where RU may commit ex ante
to remain nancially constrained ex interim through giving control rights to DUi.
If RU is independent and requires external nancing ex interim, she may join forces
with a venture capitalist (VC) who will provide cash to pay the licensee DUi the amount
I = [(To   Fo)  (Tc   sPc)] ex interim, in exchange of I=Pc shares out of the s share of
DUis revenue accruing to its coalition with the RU.5 It is crucial that such a VC is able
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to make sure that RU acts in the interest of the RU-VC coalition, so that RU does not
disseminate knowledge to DUj even though she only has a stake of s I=Pc in DUi revenues.
We believe that this is a reasonable assumption: VC is not a regular nancial intermediary,
but a specialized entity with reputational concerns, which can prevent opportunistic behavior
by its coalition partner.
The second scenario is corporate venturing. Ex ante, RU and DUi agree that RU will
cede control rights to DUi. We do not assume alienability of RUs intellectual capital. The
transfer of control rights implies only that RUs outside nancing can be vetoed by DUi.
Also, RU is required to start negotiations with DUi rst and is not allowed to sell to a
competing DUj exclusively in a closed sale with a share in DUjs revenues.6 It is easy to
see that under corporate venturing, DUi could credibly veto a RU-VC alliance. One way to
commit to this veto is to sign a contract ex ante that if RU signs any share contracts with
outsiders, her partner VC must pay DUi a su¢ ciently high penalty for a breach of her ex
ante agreement with DUi. We also assume that RU cannot make a binding promise to the
DUi about any prospective ex imterim payment, before forming a coalition with a VC.7
As corporate venturing rules out relaxing RUs nancial constraint, it may result in
knowledge licensing via the open mode when the closed mode is ex interim e¢ cient. Why
would parties want to sign such a contract? The reason is that although the independent
RU scenario is e¢ cient ex interim, it may provide perverse incentives ex ante. As shown
above, unlike Fo or Tc=2 the value of RUs revenue share sPc is decreasing in K: Therefore
the RUs nancial constraint Fc  0 tends to bind at low levels of K: By forcing open mode
sales via corporate venturing for such knowledge levels, DUi may indeed create ex interim
ine¢ ciencies. However, he may also improve RUs ex ante incentives to invest costly e¤ort
in research which is more likely to produce higher levels of K.
Whether corporate venturing is e¢ cient ex ante depends on the relative strength of these
ex ante and ex interim e¤ects. Let us consider a simple example where RU can choose one
of two e¤ort levels: high or low. The high level of e¤ort costs her e dollars more, but also
produces higher knowledge K = KH ex interim with probability 1. The low e¤ort produces
only K = KL with probability 1, where KL < KH :
6In the closed mode, the disclosure of knowledge to DUj cannot be tracked but any revenue sharing
contract is by denition veriable.
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K = KL K = KH
K 0:33 0:5
L 0:8 0:8
To 0:108 0:141
Tc 0:140 0:246
Fo 0:037 0:063
To   Fo 0:071 0:078
Tc=2 0:070 0:123
s 0:4 0:130
sPc 0:08 0:056
Tc   sPc 0:06 0:189
I 0:011  
sPc   I 0:069  
Table 1: A numerical example where corporate venturing is ex ante e¢ cient.
Suppose that in both states the closed mode dominates the open mode: T kc > T
k
o ; k =
L;H; in the high state RUs nancial constraint is not binding, while in the low state
sLPLc > maxfTLc =2; TLc   TLo + FLo g. The latter implies sLPLc > FLo so the RUs nancial
constraint is binding in the low state. Then corporate venturing matters in the low state,
and will a¤ect the RUs payo¤ if a lower level of e¤ort is chosen ex ante.
Proposition 1 Corporate venturing will strictly increase RUs research e¤ort if
maxfTHc =2; FHo g   e < sLPLc   IL and (14)
maxfTHc =2; FHo g   e > FLo : (15)
Corporate venturing will be adopted ex ante if the change in research e¤ort is cost-e¢ cient:
(THc   e)  TLc > 0: (16)
Since the closed mode is more e¢ cient in the low state, sLPLc  IL = FLo +TLc  TLo > FLo ;
the conditions (15) are consistent for some e¤ort costs e.
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Table 1 describes a numerical example where the conditions above are satised for a
range of parameter values e. We consider the case with L = 0:8; KL = 1=3; and KH = 1=2:
Indeed, the conditions (14)-(16) imply e > 0:123  0:069 = 0:054; e < 0:123  0:037 = 0:086;
and e < 0:246   0:14 = 0:106: Hence, for all e 2 (0:054; 0:086) corporate venturing strictly
increases ex ante welfare and will therefore be an equilibrium outcome.
Notice that in this example, for K = KL; DUs payo¤ in the open mode Uo = To   Fo =
0:071 binds as an outside option relative to her symmetric share of the surplus in the close
mode Tc=2 = 0:070: Thus, DU would not expect to be made an o¤er of a payo¤ greater
than 0:071 if she were to allow the RU to form a coalition with VC ex interim. Hence, her
enforcement of the control right precludes RU from forming a nancial coalition with a third
party VS is therefore renegotiation-proof ex interim.
In this example, corporate venturing allows DUi to commit to force the choice of the open
mode when K is low and RUs nancial constraint is binding sPc > maxfFo; Tc=2g: Since
corporate venturing makes the commitment credible, RU expects to su¤er from the open
mode, and therefore prefers to choose a higher level of e¤ort to produce greater knowledge
K whereby her nancial constraint does not bind. Once the high e¤ort level is taken ex
ante, corporate venturing actually becomes irrelevant ex interim (nancial constraint is not
binding in the high state); hence corporate venturing does not even result in ex interim
ine¢ ciency. The latter is an artefact of the assumption that high e¤ort level rules out the
low knowledge state with probability 1. If the low knowledge state occurred under high e¤ort
with a positive but lower probability, the results in Proposition 3 could be easily generalized;
but corporate venturing would now create a non-trivial probability of ex interim ine¢ ciency
in the licensing process. However, as we show in our companion paper, such ine¢ ciency
need not be socially suboptimal, once one takes into account the non-licensee DU.
It is important to emphasize that our main qualitative point, concerning the impact of
RUs interim wealth constraint (requiring Fc > 0) on the equilibrium choice of the mode of
licensing does not depend on the specic parameterization of the model above. The mode
choice is driven by the shape of the boundary in fK;Lg space across which Tc(K;L)  
To(K;L) changes sign (this boundary is characterized in detail in our companion paper).
But our argument does not depend on the exact form of this boundary. The only qualitative
property we require for our main insight is the possibility of the RU and DU disagreeing
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over their preferred modes of licensing ex interim, given DUs wealth constraint, that is
(To   Fo) > (Tc   sPc), for lower levels of K at which Tc(K;L) still exceeds To(K;L). For
this possibility to arise, it is su¢ cient (but far from necessary) that the expected value of
the RUs invention-contingent revenue or royalty sPc (i) is decreasing in K and (ii) exceeds
Tc=2 for low K. The specic (indirect) development cost function utilized in our model
(further characterized in our companion paper), is only one of many convex cost functions
which would give rise to this somewhat counter-intuitive property of the incentive-compatible
contract.
4 Control rights in bankruptcy and incentives for in-
novation
The main result above is driven by the role of control rights in situations where nancing
constraints are binding. It is therefore directly related to the allocation of control in bank-
ruptcies and should be compared to the recent literature on the e¤ect of bankrupty laws on
innovation. The best example of this literature is Acharya and Subramanyam (2007) who
conduct an extensive cross-country and cross-sectors empirical analysis. Their theoretical
and empirical analysis implies a thesis seemingly counter to ours, on the e¢ cacy of down-
stream DU control rights. They suggest, and provide supporting empirical evidence for,
a benecial impact of soft, or debtor-friendly, residual control rights in the bankruptcy
process, that is greater for rms and industries which they classify as being more innovative,
based on patents as well as citation counts. This e¤ect is shown by Acharya and Subrah-
manyam to hold across countries, as well as over time in response to changes in bankruptcy
laws, after adjusting for other e¤ects such as dependence on external nancing, and the
nancial development. In this section we show that our argument is consistent Acharya and
Subrahmanyams empirical results even though we have a di¤erent mechanism at work.
In essence, Acharya and Subrahmanyam argue in their modeling that greater control
rights of debtor rms regarding continuation of investment in projects with initially disap-
pointing returns, result in relatively higher e¢ ciency gains for innovative rms. In these
rms lower early returns are more likely, but even moderate early returns augur signicantly
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higher later returns, as compared to non-innovative (conservative, or low-risk) lines of in-
vestment. In the Acharya and Subramanyam model, this e¤ect arises from frictions in debt
rescheduling.8
We briey suggest here a connection between our thesis, relating to the potential impact of
third-party outside nancing for the interim e¢ ciency of the licensing of innovation, and their
results on the di¤erential impact of debtor-friendly laws or regimes in handling bankruptcy
for more innovative rms and sectors relative to traditionalsectors. Specically, we may
think of such a debtor-friendly regime as being supportive of debtor-in-possession nancing,
as in the US Chapter 11. Let us consider a modication of our example in Section 3, in
which costly ex ante research e¤ort may yield two potential paths for further development.
Assume for simplicity that these are mutually exclusive: both of these may fail but both can
not succeed at the same time. Then the optimal development path is to proceed rst with
the initially more promising path, entailing a maximal success probability KH , with costly
development requiring external nancing leading to a chosen probability PH of success.
If this rst path of development fails, then the rm that tried to develop it is still left with
the intellectual property of the other potential path of development. Suppose that this other
path entails the (possibly revised) maximal success probabilityKL < KH . However, the level
of debt overhang from the failed rst development e¤ort is too high for that developer to
credibly invest in the second line of invention. Hence, it needs to license this innovative idea
to another DU, and the surplus-maximizing mode of doing so, which is also important for the
maximization of ex ante research incentives, is the closed or trade-secret based one. However,
as in the example of Section 3 above, to do such licensing in an incentive compatible way
for a lower level of knowledge KL may require the aid of a third-party (specialized) outside
nancier. The outside funding is needed to advance the amount of funds I required for the
licensor to give the bankrupt DU the requisite revenue or royalty share. It is then likely that
8Scheduled early repayment obligations in their model are assumed to be entirely non-renegotiable, in the
form of enhancement of later repayments in response to shortfalls of early cash ows relative to repayment
obligations. In our opinion, these debt renegotiation frictions may be minor for innovative rms, both in
absolute terms and relative to those for large rms with narrow prot margins, and widely held debt..
Indeed, many smaller innovative rms are funded by knowledgeable and exible nanciers such as venture
capitalists, and larger ones often have very deep pockets to absorb short-term failures due to cash ows from
past patents.
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a new nancier would be willing to do so if and only if its claim to these potential royalties
in future is senior to those of the pre-existing creditors who nanced the failed rst e¤ort.
Allowing debtor-in-possession nancing in these contingencies would clearly be of help.
Note that our line of advocacy for debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws in circumstances like
the above is based on the need to enhance the interim e¢ ciency of the disposal of residual
intellectual property of the bankrupt rm. Our argument does not require the xity of
the claims of other creditors, nor does it assume that it is the insolvent rm which would
somehow continue in the same line of business. What it does presuppose is that the idea
involved in the initially failing invention process is multi-faceted, entailing more than one
possible line of development with di¤erent ranges of outcomes, even products. For example,
consider transistors in the early stages, when its inventors left AT&T, the rm within which
the initial innovation occurred, to pursue other lines of application.
Such a multi-faceted characteristic of innovative ideas is perhaps more likely to be true
in the sectors commonly labeled as the new economy, in which their technological pos-
sibilities and frontiers, and lines of application, are not yet fully discernible. In contrast,
even innovative ideas in more traditional old economysectors might be on average more
uni-dimensional: an idea either succeeds for its envisaged application post development, or
it fails and has no other use for it. However, ideas still di¤er in their qualities, metrized as
the maximal probability of their successful development, and higher quality ideas are gener-
ated (made more likely) only with greater costly ex ante e¤ort. In such sectors, the control
aspect of corporate venturing, via its impact on generating incentives for research units to
undertake such e¤ort, may matter more.
As an empirical measure, the ratio of citation to patent counts in a sector might serve as
a statistic suitable for judging the multi-faceted characteristics of innovative ideas in it. It
would be interesting to study if the prevalence of institutions such as corporate venturing,
across diverse sectors of an economy, is correlated with such a characteristic, as well as with
more commonly studied (qualitative) features, such as the extent of leakage from disclosure
in patents.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have elucidated a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim
innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of
initial innovators intellectual property rights. Control rights of a downstream development
unit (a buyer of interim innovations), arises from his ability to prevent the a¢ liated upstream
research unit (the innovations seller) from forming nancial coalitions at the ex interim stage
of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees, as well as the mode of licensing,
based on trade secrets or on patenting. By constraining the exibility of the upstream unit
in this manner, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research units payo¤s,
in contingencies where the latter generates lower levels of interim knowledge. This provides
the research units with greater incentives to expend costly e¤ort ex ante, helping to generate
more productive interim innovations.
Our idea shares a family resemblance with that of Hart and Moore (2004), who also view
control rights as emanating from dimensions other than just property rights (over assets or
intellectual capital), in the form of ruling out ex interim renegotiations over some items in
a multi-aspect contract. Doing so may create better ex ante incentives, when contracts are
incomplete owing to the non-veriabilty of some ex interim circumstances. Our construction
has the feature that, in some circumstances, the control right to preclude potential coalition
formation with third parties would not be renegotiated ex interim. Even if formation of a
nancial coalition could potentially improve the ex ante contracting partiesjoint ex interim
payo¤, the ex ante contract would remain renegotiation-proof, as long as potential outside
coalition partners cannot make legally binding promises to the other parties prior to the
formation of their nancial coalition with a contracting party.
Other authors have considered the advantages and disadvantages of potential develop-
ment units (DU), versus independent venture capitalists as nancial partners of wealth-
constrained upstream research units (RU). In particular, Anand and Galetovic (2002) con-
sider the tradeo¤s between the higher e¢ ciency generated by DU partners, versus their
abilty to usurp prots due to the innovation in a multi-product enterprise, and Hellmann
(2002) considers the incentives of DU partners to develop and market nal inventions that
are substitutes vs. complements to their existing products. Gompers and Lerner (2000)
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emphasize the importance of strategic t between RU and DU for the success of corporate
venturing. Our explanation of corporate venturing di¤ers from all of these, and emphasizes
considerations related bargaining processes in licensing of intellectual property.
We also point out that the issues of the potential importance of third-party interim
nancing in the licensing of intellectual property may help explain the ex ante superiority of
soft (debtor-friendly) rather than hard (creditor-friendly) bankruptcy regimes. That would
arise when interim innovative ideas may be multi-faceted in the sense of having diverse and
mutually exclusive development paths; some of these that are initially perceived to be more
promising may fail to succeed. Together, our results and this observation suggest further
avenues of both empirical and theoretical research, in particular of the impact of corporate
versus independent venture nancing on innovative activity, and patenting proclivity, on
their respective optimality as well as those of di¤ering bankruptcy regimes in the old
vs newinnovative sectors.
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